From just talking to people I feel there is a profound change in attitudes to religion (at least Christianity) and atheism from 100 and more years ago. We used to think of religion as a gloomy matter of sin and redemption (if you were lucky enough to be saved) whereas the secularist held out a bright future of progress with getting rid of the evils of poverty and superstition. Now things look rather different. I have actually met people who feel that if the promises held out by either religion or politics cannot be met, then the universe is a hostile and evil place. But more common is my own mother's feeling that, whatever the truth of philosophy or theology, religious people are more hopeful than others and some of them show a compassion or peace you don't find elsewhere. I find that myself on the personal level, but, sadly, as soon as religion moves into the public field of moral issues and ethnic identities or historical claims, the peace and compassion disappear. Yet 'progressives' themselves rarely take the secular progress idea seriously any more - they're just scared of the alternative!

That sort of change makes it all the more urgent to sort out moral dilemmas which neither religion nor secularism has resolved, with only narrow partisan groups (despised and feared by others) claiming to believe they can offer solutions alone. When questions of ethics arise we have to deal with the error, common in secular thinking as well as religious, of supposing that unless our ethics can be derived from some eternal truth (the will of God being an obvious illustration, but others like mathematics, history, or reason in general have each been tried) they must be purely a matter of opinion. If we insist that ethics must be proved true on metaphysical grounds, then that follows. But if we say they derive from practicalities of living, then not necessarily so. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) understood that ethics deal with people's free choices in everyday practical situations, on which they have to act in carrying out decisions. Sadly, Kant's solution does not work in the world of today, first, because while it is true that many people (not all; some appear to be quite amoral) do have and feel a moral imperative or sense of duty inside themselves, they are not necessarily prepared to work out for themselves which principles or maxims,in Kant's terminology, they should follow. Second and still more important, even if they do work things out, they will not all arrive at the same answers. We can recognise moral arguments as frequently being when different people, or groups of people, display different moral senses from one another. For example, some people believe that killing is wrong and this forbids capital punishment, whereas others believe - equally sincerely - that some actions are so outrageous and evil that the death penalty is the only fit punishment. There can also be another ethical division on capital punishment, for, in addition to the factual argument about whether capital punishment is a deterrant, there is the ethical divide on whether deterrence itself is a valid principle or objective. There are many issues of this kind, which show that relying on people's innate moral sense to find what they will (freely) choose as their duty, and then apply this to social rules, is not a sufficient guide. Putting the issue in Kantian terms, they do not agree on which of their various possible maxims they should all accept as our universal moral laws.

Yet these issues do not mean that it makes sense to leave ethics as a matter of 'opinion'. In each case, there is a decision to be made. A decision is quite distinct from an opinion, which may or may not be acted upon at all. Choosing to make a decision on something, whether for an individual in her own life or for a wider society, does not state any abstract or certain truth, but it does mean a commitment going beyond an opinion into action.

 

We can lead on from this by accepting that the universe is a tough place. Modern cosmology and ecology imply we're extremely lucky to be here at all, around a peaceable star in a relatively quiet neighbourhood of the galaxy. Even our planet is a quiet affair without any very recent supervolcano eruptions. (When Sirius gives up the ghost in a supernova, or if we can't sort out a diversion for any awkwardly placed asteroids or black holes, we'd better be elsewhere.) The latest discoveries suggest the prospects are for the universe to go on expanding indefinitely, so it just ends up cold, dark, and dead. But to talk of 'evil' or 'hostile' we have to have some sort of conscious deliberation which is vicious, rather than just the unconscious: i.e.,lacking in the sort of intention or deliberation we associate with 'consciousness', processes which scientific 'laws' (i.e., theories which appear to fit out there) describe. Ethics or morality, and therefore conceptions of good and evil, right and wrong, etc., deal with something quite different. These relate to deliberate intentions, leading to actions, and contact with other people who may be affected by how we act.¹

 

That is exactly why development of science and expansion of scientific knowledge has the reverse effect on morality or ethical principles from the one positivists might have expected. As every successful science generates technologies in its wake, it extends the range of possible (deliberate) actions which can then be subjects of ethical choice and controversy. We need only look at medical or military technologies to see this working in practice. In point of fact technology - doing things which can be understood through science like making magnets or breeding plants or animals - may come before a proper understanding in terms of scientific theory, but that makes no difference to the general principle.

 

Once technology applies a science, ethical or moral choices, and therefore questions as to appropriate decisions, move in to the new space created for them. The neo-Darwinists are as fond as the old Freudians ever were of pointing out that the processes which influence our behaviour, including moral behaviour, are largely unconscious - our ancestors' survival and breeding depended on them and (until recently) we don't think about them. But once we have both a scientific understanding of these things and growing technologies which can interfere, the processes are no longer wholly unconscious and we start making decisions about them. Once that happens, new issues appear which are moral, not scientific. Some scientists themselves, notably the physicist and environmentalist Michio Kaku, are appealing to the rest of us to start debating possibilities like conscious direction of our evolution, redesigned children as a fashion accessory for the rich, or machine intelligence, right now. In particular I would like to see serious moral philosophers getting involved in debating such issues, and the (probably) resulting obsolescence of the Nature/Nurture argument, rather than leaving them to assorted cranks and bigots.

 

Some of us may recall that the Human Genome Project already claimed to have mapped the entire set of human genes in 2000. In light of the sudden and perplexing revision in the estimated number of these genes from 100,000-140,000 down to 26,000-40,000 (a reduction of around 70%!), we must remain unsure what that signifies. In any event, we will still not understand what all the genes do, or how they work together. Still less do we understand the part played by other 'junk' DNA in each chromosome. Yet already, we have an international agreement about treatments for genetic diseases which bans 'germline therapy'; that is, therapy involving changes to the patient's genetic material which she can pass on to descendants. Treatment has to be confined to 'somatic therapy' by which modifications to the patient's genome will not be passed on to her descendants. Needless to say, that is an ethical decision, not a scientific or technical one. But, essentially, it is also a conscious decision and one which humans have the capacity to reverse if they choose to do so.²

 

At the same time, scientists investigating HIV infection want authorisation to do germline therapy. The argument which matters here is not whether they can do it, but whether they should be allowed to do it. That is an ethical, not a scientific (or technical) question. This means that unless we believe there is a God whose place as creator of life is being usurped the answer will not be a true or false statement so much as a choice of right and wrong. People will have diverse opinions about the question of right and wrong here, but even to prohibit germline therapy means making achoice and then a decision between the possible opinions. Later such a decision might be judged wrong and reversed, probably through a quasi-judicial process of international agreement. But in any case the matter of right or wrong, good or evil, virtue or vice, further appears - either in respect of those uses to which the therapy might be put, or else those uses excluded because the therapy was prohibited.

 

Earlier this century Einstein agonised over the way his very abstruse science could be applied in practical terms through nuclear technology. We see here the connection between science and ethics, with the latter having to deal with applications of the former (through technology). But we also see the nature of ethics or moral values as being not about truths of the universe, but rather about the choices which these truths may leave open to us. Then it becomes quite natural that science; far from squeezing out philosophy (including ethics and morality) as some have imagined, on the contrary gives it far more to do.

 

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1. Q: Can we use folly to assess morality? A: Yes, provided we can agree folly is no category of immorality.

2. Churchill proclaimed 'We shall never surrender!' Now we fight over who we shall never surrender to.

3. How can history be a science when alternative history stories are fantasy, not experiment?

4. The lesson of a Presidential impeachment is that condemnation fails when virtue is already corrupted.

5. Is there comfort in religion when the transcendent is immanent enough to tell us to do what we want?

6. The global economy depends upon the principle that drama is required training for any employment.

7. Stress is good for you until it becomes anxiety.

8. Tolerance is repressive because it insists that you tolerate other people.

9. The neo-Darwinists have not kept up with our desertion of biological roots - we make love songs banal.

10. (a) Inquiry into Meaning - the main project of analytic philosophy. Sub-title: 'Or, how can we rumble the lying bastards?' (b) Modern philosophy is a footnote to advertising campaigns.

11. Metaphysics is a way to understand things, not to live with them.

12. A nationalist is someone who wants to keep the homeland, and then turns the homeland into a wasteland to keep its economy up with its peers.

13. A patriot is someone who encourages politicians to spend money on prestige projects.

14. Our present culture confuses barbarity with sincerity.

15. Socrates knew how to learn because he asked questions instead of presenting a thesis.

16. Clarifying language can solve metaphysical problems because we have no choice about them. But we have not decided whether we have a choice about moral problems.

17. Q: If the problem of ethics without religion is a sociological, not a philosophical, problem, can secularists find a sociological solution? A: Maybe,if they let rebels remind them that religion is not always a matter of propping up the status quo.

18. Moral philosophy cannot provide love, but it can allow it.

19. 'Keeping up with the Jones' is the point of honour transferred to material products and education.

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If it is true that we talk most about the things we don't have or can't find, then we should not be surprised about trust getting more attention lately in areas ranging from business economics to sex relationships. After all, who do we trust? Even scientists are suspect as careerists or as stooges of big business and political pressures. Religious bodies are trusted in many parts of the world, but just in those communities where faith is strongest religion confronts the challenge to make a message of peace and justice other than a demonic joke. Thanks to such terrors as climate change, genetic engineering, or cosmic catastrophe science is taking over the role of prophecy - including warning us of the error of our ways - along with the challenge of finding prophets that the people will actually trust.

In these conditions, should we wonder why so much energy in twentieth century philosophy went on trying to deal with questions of meaning? Still less why writers in the sociobiological current such as Pinker(1993,1998) have not only developed explanations of why language competence has been such an evolutionary success story, but also devoted much attention to the role of deception in communication. (Characteristically, deception's reflection in efforts to expose and counteract deception receives less attention). No doubt this line of thought does help us to understand our past - with some limited support from physiological evidence like facial bone structures that we evolved a lower voice box capable of making a wider range of sound; it may tell us why Neanderthals, for instance, did not fare so well as homo sapiens. But like analytic philosophy and public relations it fits a present where we are either trying to communicate to people whose first belief is that we are all liars, or else trying to sort out just what we can accept as true amid a welter pleadings, pledges, and half-truths! The more outrageous rock stars and icons have a different method: Tell them you're trash and then they'll believe you!

In the 1940s Orwell had tried to combat totalitarian propaganda with advocacy of the clarity of 'standard English'; only to fall foul of the various polemical 'class' associations of standard English itself. That proved to be only one particular example of the problem that we do not even trust the languages we speak and write; in desperation we join with advertisers and sloganisers in debasing the language and its resources in search of something we can believe in. I guess the sloganisers will ensure that's a futile quest. If we want something we can trust, we must concentrate on what we say, not how we say it. If that turns out to sound posh, then so be it!

All this leaves the plight of those especially charged with putting a moral viewpoint on any matter of wider concern. In the world of polemics between sundry pressure groups and then the various religious and political campaign themes, we find leaders making fools of themselves proclaiming on moral themes only to find themselves blasted as hypocrites if they (or their colleagues) don't match up to standard, or blasted as puritans telling us what to do if they do, or else suspect as potential fanatic tyrants. No wonder some prefer to keep their mouths shut! Such is the rationale behind my interest in direct democracy. Why not confine leadership to organising the rest of us to settle our values, by direct vote if need be? After all, we're gaining experience on combatting vote rigging all the time, are we not? That would leave the partisans free to spout their polemics to their hearts'content, and if we then make crass decisions, that's our lookout.

Notes

1. It is an ancient notion,present for instance in Christian thought, and embodied in laws of criminal responsibility or contract that moral action, together with responsibility and guilt, depends upon conscious intention. Unconscious behaviour cannot be morally right or wrong, which used to be an argument for saying other animals don't have 'souls'. However, many modern observers believe other animals do have a degree of consciousness.

2. Germline therapy, which means introduction (or removal) of genetic material to the patient making a change that can be passed on to the patient's descendants, is distinct from somatic therapy, used now in treating genetic disease and permitted under the international agreement, which does not make heritable changes.

 

READING SUGGESTIONS

Very often, the most helpful approach if you're interested in ethics or morality, or philosophies around them, is to try three things: 1) Look into some general work on the subject like Mary Warnock Ethics since 1900, (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn., 1978); 2) Look at some of the classics in the field: anything you can find from ethical teachings of the world religions or ancient writers like Plato or St. Thomas Aquinas to more modern stuff such as Mill and utilitarianism (Mill put forward the principle that we can do as we wish provided we don't harm other people) or Ayer and 'emotivism' (roughly, our moral values come from our emotional responses to things as being good or bad). Immanuel Kant tries to tackle all the problems, whilst Friedrich Nietzsche seems especially in touch with the modern world. You may or may not agree with what any of these people have to say, but they can all be illuminating. 3) Just think about any live ethical issue you may feel important: might it be restricting health care to people who can afford the insurance; abortion; treatment of children or whatever else? Any issue has its own specialist literature, and you can often follow it in the media. Do ethical ideas put forward by classical writers lead to a sensible, or acceptable, solution in such particular cases?

The recent developments in social science have encouraged some people to think they are on the track of why we have the moral values we do. Notice that 20-30 years ago a Marxist explanation in terms of ruling class ideologies was accepted by a considerable number of people, whereas now Darwinian explanations in terms of our evolved emotional responses are more fashionable. Which do you favour? Again, you can move from ethics to sociology or even biology to find out more.